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THE RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED COHABITING
COUPLES TO HOUSING IN NEW YORK
I. Introduction
Discrimination in housing' exists in a wide variety of forms2 and
reflects several factors including race, creed, color, and national ori-
gin. 3 There also exist widespread discriminatory practices based on
sex, age, disability, and marital status. 4 Marital status discrimination
in housing has become increasingly common in New York over the
1. For purposes of this Note "housing" and "housing accommodation" will be used
interchangeably. The New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City
Human Rights Law define the term "housing accommodation" to include "any
building, structure, or portion thereof which is used or occupied ... as the home,
residence or sleeping place of one or more human beings." N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 292(10)
(McKinney 1982); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 1, § B1-2.0(10) (1976). This
"housing accommodation" can be for sale, rent, or lease. N.Y. ExEc. LAW §
296(5)(a)(1) (McKinney 1982).
2. Housing discrimination includes the refusal to rent, sell or lease housing accom-
modations. Munroe v. 344 E. 76th Realty Corp., 113 Misc. 2d 155, 156, 448
N.Y.S.2d 388, 389-90 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982). Housing discrimination can
occur after the inception of the lease, i.e., it need not occur at the leasing or selling
stage. Id. at 157, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 390 (refusal to renew tenant's lease is housing
discrimination within the language of the statute); Yorkshire House Assocs. v.
Lulkin, 114 Misc. 2d 40, 42, 450 N.Y.S.2d 962, 964 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1982) (terms and conditions in a lease may also constitute marital status discrimina-
tion). The discriminator can be a landlord in a privately owned building, or the state
or federal government in publicly-assisted housing. The standard form lease in New
York contains an "immediate family" clause, which limits occupancy of the premises
to the tenant and his or her immediate family. This clause may be construed as a
form of housing discrimination. How to Handle Unmarried Couples, New York City
Apartment Law Insider, Dec. 1981, at 1, col. 1 (discussion of if and how a landlord
can evict two cohabiting adults living in his apartment building); see also Yorkshire,
114 Misc. 2d at 42, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 964 (lease clause limiting occupancy to tenant's
immediate family was discrimination based on marital status). Furthermore, a "sin-
gles only" restriction contained within a lease has been held violative of the state's
and city's public policy against marital status discrimination. Leonedas Realty Corp.
v. Brodowsky, 115 Misc. 2d 88, 90-91, 454 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
Queens County 1982).
3. Diona v. Lomenzo, 26 A.D.2d 473, 275 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1st Dep't 1966). Dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, creed, or national origin is a matter of state
concern because it threatens the rights of all inhabitants of a free democratic society.
Id. at 476, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 667. See also State Div. of Human Rights v. Cerminaro,
63 A.D.2d 855, 405 N.Y.S.2d 860 (4th Dep't 1978) (patent and intentional discrimi-
nation on the basis of race).
4. State Div. of Human Rights v. Village of Spencerport, 78 A.D.2d 50, 52, 434
N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (4th Dep't 1980) (dismissed complaint of alleged employment dis-
crimination on the basis of marital status).
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past few years. 5 Between 1981 and 1982 the number of complaints of
marital status discrimination in housing received by the New York
City Commission on Human Rights increased from 15% to 26% of
the total number of housing discrimination complaints. 6 Unmarried
cohabiting couples accounted for 40% of these marital status com-
plaints in 1982. 7 Under the current interpretation of New York law 8
these couples cannot be certain of receiving marital status protection
against housing discrimination.
This Note will examine the protections available to unmarried
couples against housing discrimination under the marital status provi-
sion of the New York City and New York State Human Rights Laws.9
5. In 1981, 189 housing discrimination complaints were received by the New York
City Commission on Human Rights. Twenty-eight of these were marital status
complaints, twelve of which were filed by unmarried couples. New York City
Commission on Human Rights, Statistics: Marital Status Complaints in Housing
(1981). As of August 20, 1982 the total number of filed housing discrimination
complaints for the year 1982 was 153. Forty of these cases were marital status
complaints, sixteen of which were filed by unmarried couples. New York City
Commission on Human Rights, Statistics: Marital Status Complaints in Housing
(1982). The State Human Rights Division received 61 complaints of marital status
discrimination in housing for the fiscal year beginning April 31, 1980, and ending
March 31, 1981. For the fiscal year beginning April 1, 1981 and ending March 31,
1982, the State Division received 58 of these marital status complaints. Telephone
interview with Mr. Preston Israel, Program Research Specialist 3, Public Information
Unit of the State Human Rights Division (Oct. 18, 1982).
It is important to note that these figures represent only the number of marital
status discrimination complaints actually received by New York administrative agen-
cies. Complaints of marital status discrimination also arise in the courts as a defense
to a landlord's holdover proceeding. Yorkshire House Assocs. v. Lulkin, 114 Misc. 2d
40, 450 N.Y.S.2d 962 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1982). However, there are no
figures available to determine the number of judicial complaints.
6. New York City Commission on Human Rights, Statistics: Marital Status Com-
plaints in Housing (1981 & 1982).
7. Id.
8. In this context New York law refers to the interpretation of the New York City
and New York State Human Rights Laws by both the judiciary and administrative
agencies.
9. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(5)(a) (McKinney 1982) provides:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for the owner, lessee, sub-
lessee, assignee, or managing agent of, or other person having the right to
sell, rent or lease a housing accommodation, constructed or to be con-
structed, or any agent or employee thereof:
(1) To refuse to sell, rent, lease or otherwise to deny to or withhold from
any person or group of persons such a housing accommodation because of
the race, creed, color, national origin, sex, or disability or marital status of
such person or persons.
The New York State Human Rights Law is virtually identical to the New York City
Human Rights Law, NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 1, § BI-7.0(5)(a) (1976).
Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 106 Misc. 2d 251, 256, 431 N.Y.S.2d 632, 635
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After a brief examination of cohabitation, 0 this Note will review
judicial and administrative construction of the Human Rights Law
since its inception. This Note concludes by proposing that unwed
couples be given the same protection as married couples under the
marital status provision in the New York Human Rights Law. This
proposition finds support in: (1) the statutory mandate that the Hu-
man Rights Law be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose," (2)
recent New York case law interpreting the marital status provision to
provide the growing number of unwed couples with an unimpeded
opportunity to obtain housing12 and (3) broad rulings by the New
York Human Rights agencies. 13
II. Cohabitation
The informal living arrangement of two unmarried adults, also
known as cohabitation, has become increasingly common in the
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980), rev'd, 109 Misc. 2d 589, 442 N.Y.S.2d 367
(App. Term 1st Dep't 1981), rev'd, 86 A.D.2d 803, 448 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1st Dep't 1982)
(adopting dissenting opinion of Asch, J., 109 Misc. 2d at 595, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 371).
10. For purposes of this Note "cohabitation" is defined as the informal living
arrangement between an unmarried man and woman who share housing accommo-
dations whether it be by lease, ownership or assignment. It includes, but is not
limited to, the cohabitation which would be required for a common law marriage
(New York does not recognize the common law marriage), meaning that a couple can
be engaged in cohabitation without assuming marital rights, duties and obligations.
The couple does not have to hold itself out to the rest of the world as husband and
wife. "This requirement is anachronistic and therefore not necessary in light of the
burgeoning number of unmarried couples openly living together, and the growing
acceptability of such arrangements." Zimmerman v. Burton, 107 Misc. 2d 401, 404,
434 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980). This definition of
cohabitation does not include homosexual couples; such relationships are beyond the
scope of this Note. The marital status provision has not yet been extended to include
unmarried homosexual couples. 420 E. 80th Co. v. Chin, 115 Misc. 2d 195, 196, 455
N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1982) (discrimination against two adult
homosexual males is not discrimination on the basis of marital status); see also Alley,
Marital Status Discrimination: An Amorphous Prohibition, 54 FLA. B.J. 217, 221
n.11 (1980) ("the better view would appear to be that homosexuals should not be
afforded protection under the 'marital status' discrimination prohibition . . .").
11. "The provisions of this article shall be construed liberally for the accomplish-
ment of the purposes thereof." N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 300 (McKinney 1982).
12. Mishalove v. 109 St. Marks Place, Inc., No. 62-581-H, at 12 (N.Y.C. Comm'n
on Human Rights Nov. 13, 1981) (quoting Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 109
Misc. 2d 589, 595-96, 442 N.Y.S.2d 367, 372 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1981) (Asch, J.,
dissenting), adopted by 86 A.D.2d 803, 448 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1st Dep't 1982)). The
increasing judicial and social acceptance of these relationships, see note 19 infra and
accompanying text, as well as the growing number of participants, see notes 14-15
infra and accompanying text, all provide support for judicial and legislative protec-
tion of unwed cohabitants.
13. See notes 96-102 infra and accompanying text.
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United States over the past two decades. 14 By 1980, there were ap-
proximately 2.8 million cohabiting couples in this country. 15 Tradi-
tionally, cohabitation was not socially acceptable. It was considered
to be deviant behavior 6 and was once common only among the poor
and minority groups.' 7 Today, cohabitation is increasingly common
among other social groups, including young people, pensioners and
those who receive benefits subject to termination or reduction upon
formal marriage.' The courts and legislatures have played a major
14. Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior: Sanctions on Non-Marital
Cohabitation, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 275, 275 (extensive discussion of the changing social
and judicial views towards cohabitation).
15. The precise figure given is 2.799 million. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, P-20, No. 365, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH
1980. From 1960 to 1970 the number of unmarried couples increased by over 700 %.
See Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L.
REV. 663, 686 (1976) (development of informal marriages and changing judicial and
social attitudes); Note, Fornication, Cohabitation and the Constitution, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 252, 254-57 (1978) (discussion of fornication, cohabitation and their relation to
the right of privacy).
16. See Fineman, supra note 14, at 276.
17. Skolnick, The Social Contexts of Cohabitation, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 339, 341
(1981) (general discussion of cohabitation and the reasons for its increasing accept-
ability). "Census data show that although unmarried couples are more likely to be
poor than married ones, most are above the poverty line .... I d.
18. Glendon, supra note 15, at 686. "Motivations to enter informal rather than
legal marriage include economic advantages as in the case of many elderly people,
inability to enter a legal marriage, unwillingness to be subject to the legal effects of
marriage, desire for a 'trial marriage,' and lack of concern with the legal institution."
Id. at 687.
There is a clear disincentive to remarry for older people who rely on social security
benefits attributable to the earnings of a deceased or divorced spouse. Some catego-
ries of social security recipients lose their benefits upon remarriage. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(c) (1976) (divorced wives); id. § 402(e)(1)(A) (widows); id. §
402(f)(1)(A) (widowers); id. § 402(g)(1)(A) (surviving or divorced mothers); id. §
402(h)(1)(C) (parent of decedent). See generally Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52
n.8 (1977) (analysis and discussion of congressional use of age and marital status to
determine dependency).
Furthermore, the right of a surviving spouse to elect a statutory share of the
decedent spouse's estate may discourage marriage. Those wishing to preserve their
separate estates for their individual families by a previous marriage may be frustrated
by their surviving spouse. Glendon, supra note 15, at 687 n.99.
Another incentive for couples to live together, rather than marry, is the "marriage
penalty" in the federal income tax laws. I.R.C. § l(d) (Supp. IV 1980). "Where both
parties are wage earners, the Federal income tax laws, since 1969, have provided an
economic incentive for couples to remain unmarried." Donovan v. Scuderi, 51 Md.
App. 217, 221, 443 A.2d 121, 129 (Spec. App. 1982) (Wilner, J., concurring). See
Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1429-31
(1975) (married persons filing separately use a different less favorable rate schedule
than unmarried persons). The Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) helped to allevi-
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role in making cohabitation more acceptable. 19 Today, the majority of
states have repealed statutes which once penalized cohabitation.
20
Fornication, however, continues to be a crime in some states. 2' Al-
though criminal cohabitation and fornication statutes are rarely en-
forced,22 their existence may prevent unmarried couples from enforc-
ing their rights to housing. 2
3
ate partially the "marriage penalty." Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 § 103,
I.R.C. § 221 (Supp. V 1981). Nonetheless, the "marriage penalty" still exists. See S.
REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-33, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 105, 136-39.
19. Skolnick, supra note 17, at 342. The courts may be more responsible than the
legislatures for changes in the civil area, since judicial decisions are less open to
public scrutiny than legislative enactments. Fineman, supra note 14, at 278.
20. Only 16 states still have statutes which make cohabitation unlawful. Aiuz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1409 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.02 (West 1976); IDAHO
CODE § 18-6604 (1979) (reenacted by Act of March 27, 1972, ch. 336, § 1, 1972 Idaho
Sess. Laws 844); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-8 (Smith-Hurd 1979) (cohabitation is
included within the offense of fornication); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 16 (Michie/
Law. Co-op 1980); MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 750.335 (1968); Miss. CODE ANN. §
97-29-1 (1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-10-2 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-10
(1976); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (1976) (definition of fornication includes cohabi-
tation or carnal intercourse); VA. CODE § 18.2-345 (1982); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-4
(1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.20(3) (West 1982) (lewd and lascivious behavior
includes cohabitation that implies sexual intercourse). See generally Note, supra note
15, at 254 n.5.
21. Fornication, which has been defined as voluntary sexual intercourse between
an unmarried person and another person, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-18 (1982), remains
a crime in 15 states and the District of Columbia. ALA. CODE § 13-8-1 (1975); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 798.03 (West 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-18 (1982); IDAHO CODE §
18-6603 (1979) (reenacted by Act of March 27, 1972, ch. 336, § 1, 1972 Idaho Sess.
Laws 844); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-8 (Smith-Hurd 1979); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.
272, § 18 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1980); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (1972); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-184 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-08 (1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
6-3 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (1978);
VA. CODE § 18.2-344 (1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1002 (1981); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-
3 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.15 (West 1982). See generally Note, supra note 15,
at 254 n.4. For a discussion of the validity of fornication statutes, see Annot., 41
A.L.R. 3d 1338 (1972).
22. Note, supra note 15, at 271 n.97. "[T]he crimes of fornication ... and ...
cohabitation are never, or substantially never, made the subject of prosecution." Fort
v. Fort, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1594, 1596, 425 N.E.2d 754, 758 (1981)
(father was given custody of his child despite being in violation of the fornication,
adultery and cohabitation statutes).
23. Since cohabitation was made a crime by state law, "[c]ohabitors also received
no legal protection from those who disapproved of such unions and attempted to
deprive them of certain benefits or entitlements because of their status." Fineman,
supra note 14, at 316. See also Doran, Living In Sin, 6 STUDENT LAW. 38 (Dec. 1977)
(analysis of the problems facing couples who live together without the benefit of
marriage).
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III. Judicial Construction of The New York Human Rights Law
In enacting the "Human Rights Law,"' 24 the New York State Legis-
lature declared that failure to provide every individual with an equal
opportunity to enjoy a full and productive life due to discrimination
or inadequate housing not only threatens the rights and proper privi-
leges of its inhabitants but also threatens the peace, order and general
welfare of the state. 25 The Division of Human Rights, 26 which has the
authority to develop human rights plans and policies, 27 was created to
enforce the Human Rights Law. 2 To assist the Human Rights Divi-
sion, the Legislature directed that the statute be construed liberally to
accomplish its purposes. 2
The New York Human Rights Law was initially enacted to prohibit
discrimination based upon race, creed, color and national origin. 30 It
24. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 290(1) (McKinney 1982) ("This article shall be known as
the 'Human Rights Law.' "). The enactment of the Human Rights Law is an exercise
of the police power of the state to protect public health, welfare and peace in
fulfillment of the state constitutional provisions regarding civil rights. Id. § 290(2).
See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
25. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290(3) (McKinney 1982).
26. Id. §§ 290(3), 293(1) (McKinney 1982). See also State Div. of Human Rights v.
Village of Spencerport, 78 A.D.2d 50, 52, 434 N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (4th Dep't 1980)
(analysis of the reasons for the creation of the Human Rights Law and the Human
Rights Division). Senator Bernard Smith, who proposed the 1975 amendment to the
Human Rights Law, stated that "[t]he purpose of this bill is to extend the jurisdiction
of the New York State Division of Human Rights to complaints of discrimination
resulting ...from the status of divorced, separated, widowed or single persons, or
from other status related to marriage." [1975] NEW YORK LEGIS. ANN. 65.
27. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 295(9) (McKinney 1982). The Human Rights Division is
authorized "[t]o develop human rights plans and policies for the state ...to pro-
mote good-will and minimize or eliminate discrimination because of age, race, creed,
color, national origin, sex, disability or marital status." Id. (emphasis added).
28. Id. § 295(5) (McKinney 1982) provides that the Division of Human Rights has
authority "[t]o adopt, promulgate, amend and rescind suitable rules and regulations
to carry out the provisions of this article." Id.
29. Id. § 300 (McKinney 1982). "The provisions of this article shall be construed
liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof." Id. See New York Inst. of
Technology v. State Div. of Human Rights, 40 N.Y.2d 316, 353 N.E.2d 598, 386
N.Y.S.2d 685 (1976) (involving sex discrimination in employment; since the Human
Rights Law is to be liberally construed, the commissioner may in a proper case grant
tenure); 300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176,
379 N.E.2d 1183, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1978) (involving race and color discrimination;
since the statute should be construed liberally to accomplish its purpose, the commis-
sioner's findings were held to be amply supported).
30. See State Div. of Human Rights v. Village of Spencerport, 78 A.D.2d 50, 52,
434 N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (4th Dep't 1980). In 1951 the Human Rights Law prohibited
"employment discrimination" on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin.
1951 N.Y. Laws ch. 800 § 296 (codified at N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(1) (McKinney
1982)). In 1952 the law was amended to prohibit "discriminatory practices" in the
386 [Vol. XI
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soon became apparent that widespread discriminatory practices based
on sex, age, disability, and marital status, which were overlooked in
the original bill, also existed. 31 In 1975, New York amended its Hu-
man Rights Law to include a prohibition against marital status dis-
crimination in housing. 32 This provision has been narrowly construed
by the New York Court of Appeals in an employment discrimination
case to include only an individual's status of being married, single,
divorced, or widowed. 33 The statute, however, has also been broadly
interpreted by other courts to protect unwed cohabiting couples.
34
The court of appeals has yet to determine squarely whether unmar-
ried couples should be protected against housing discrimination under
the marital status provision of the Human Rights Law.3 5 The court,
however, has suggested that marital status would not protect unwed
couples. 36
withholding or denying of public accommodations to any person on the basis of race,
creed, color, or national origin. 1952 N.Y. Laws ch. 285 § 6 (codified at N.Y. ExEc.
LAW § 296(2) (McKinney 1982)).
31. State Div. of Human Rights v. Village of Spencerport, 78 A.D.2d 50, 52, 434
N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (4th Dep't 1980). In 1971 the New York State Legislature amended
the Human Rights Law to prohibit discrimination in any place of public accommo-
dation on the basis of sex, 1971 N.Y. Laws ch. 1194 § 1 (codified at N.Y. ExEc. LAW
§ 296(2) (McKinney 1982)); in 1974 the law was extended to reach cases involving
discrimination on the basis of disability. 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 988 § 4 (codified at N.Y.
ExEc. LAW § 296(5)(a) (McKinney 1982)). Marital status was first added to the
Human Rights Law in 1974 as a protected area in financial matters. 1974 N.Y. Laws
ch. 173 § 6 (codified at N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296-a(1)(a) (McKinney 1982)). The
purpose of this bill is "[t]o prohibit discrimination on the basis of ... marital status
in the extension of credit." Legislative Memorandum of State Executive Department
of New York, reprinted in 1974 N.Y. Laws 1962.
32. 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 803 § 10 (codified at N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(5)(a) (McKin-
ney 1982)). "[T]he State has assumed ... an overriding responsibility to ensure that
access to housing throughout the State will not be denied on the ground of marital
status, or lack of it." McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 111 Misc. 2d 1046, 1058, 445
N.Y.S.2d 859, 867 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981). The 1975 amendment also
extended the marital status protection to employment discrimination. 1975 N.Y.
Laws ch. 803 § 1 (codified at N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(1) (McKinney 1982)).
33. Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51
N.Y.2d 506, 512, 415 N.E.2d 950, 953, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 964 (1980).
34. Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 86 A.D.2d 803, 448 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1st Dep't
1982) (adopting dissenting opinion of Asch, J., 109 Misc. 2d 589, 595, 442 N.Y.S.2d
367, 371 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1981)), aff'g 106 Misc. 2d 251, 431 N.Y.S.2d 632
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
35. Motion for leave to appeal to the court of appeals was granted on April 1,
1982. Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 87 A.D.2d 750 (1st Dep't 1982). The
arguments are scheduled to be heard in Spring, 1983. Telephone interview with the
Calendar Clerk of the New York Court of Appeals (Jan. 27, 1983).
36. Manhattan Pizza Hut, 51 N.Y.2d 506, 415 N.E.2d 950, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961
(1980). See notes 37-47 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of Manhattan
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In Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights
Appeal Board,37 the New York Court of Appeals upheld an employer's
anti-nepotism rule against a charge of marital status discrimination. 38
The court determined that the focus of the Human Rights Law was on
an individual's position relative to marriage, rather than that person's
relationship to another person. 3 A distinction was made between an
individual's marital status, which is protected, and an individual's
marital relationship, which is unprotected. 40 The former relates to
whether an individual is divorced, separated, widowed, or single; the
latter relates to identification of one's present or former partner, who
may very well have a different status. 41 This interpretation places
unmarried couples into the latter, unprotected, category. 42
Manhattan Pizza Hut, however, is not dispositive of the rights of
unwed cohabitants to housing accommodations. First, it involved
marital status discrimination in an employment context, not in a
housing context. 43 The policy reasons behind the marital status provi-
sion differ in each area. The court in Manhattan Pizza Hut empha-
sized the concerns of business and labor and the valid reasons behind
the anti-nepotism policy, such as the avoidance of favoritism. 44 By
contrast, the addition of marital status in the housing area to the
Human Rights Law reflects changing societal mores and the common-
Pizza Hut. See also How to Handle Unmarried Couples, New York City Apartment
Law Insider, Dec. 1981, at 2, col. 1 (discussion of if and how a landlord can evict
two cohabiting adults living in his apartment building).
37. 51 N.Y.2d 506, 415 N.E.2d 950, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1980).
38. Id. at 514, 415 N.E.2d at 954, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 965. Manhattan Pizza Hut,
Inc., had an employment policy which prohibited an employee from working under
the supervision of a relative. The complainant, who worked under direct supervision
of her husband, was discharged pursuant to the anti-nepotism rule. She alleged that
this anti-nepotism rule violated the marital status provision of the Human Rights
Law. Id. at 509-10, 415 N.E.2d at 951-52, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 962-63.
39. Id. at 512, 415 N.E.2d at 953, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
40. Judge Fuchsberg stated that "[h]ad the Legislature desired to enlarge the scope
of its proscription to prohibit discrimination based on an individual's marital rela-
tionships-rather than simply on an individual's marital status-surely it would have
done so." Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. Contra Mishalove v. 109 St. Marks Place, Inc., No. 62-581-H (N.Y.C.
Comm'n on Human Rights Nov. 13, 1981). The New York City Human Rights
Commission, relying on dictum in Manhattan Pizza Hut, determined that a landlord
could not compel an unmarried couple to sign a new lease at a vacancy-lease rent
increase. Id.
43. Manhattan Pizza Hut, 51 N.Y.2d at 510, 415 N.E.2d at 952, 434 N.Y.S.2d at
963.
44. Id. at 513, 415 N.E.2d at 954, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
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place practice of "non-marital" living arrangements. 45 Second, the
complainants in Manhattan Pizza Hut were a married couple; absent
from the opinion was any reference to unwed couples. 46 Furthermore,
the anti-nepotism policy in question would not even affect an unmar-
ried couple. 41 Manhattan Pizza Hut, therefore, should not be applied
to deny unwed couples marital status protection.
A. The Traditional View
The statutory mandate requiring liberal construction of the Human
Rights Law has led to judicial48 and administrative decisions4 favor-
able to unmarried couples in the housing context. 50 Some courts,
however, have takeh a more traditional view and have denied rights
and protections to unmarried couples in housing.51
The traditional view, which would deny rights and privileges to
unwed cohabiting couples in housing, is exemplified in Fraydun En-
terprises v. Ettinger.5 2 In that case, the Appellate Term of the New
York State Supreme Court held that the presence of a tenant's fiancee
in his apartment amounted to a breach of a substantial obligation of
the tenancy warranting termination of the lease. 53 Although Fraydun
45. 420 E. 80th Co. v. Chin, 115 Misc. 2d 195, 196, 455 N.Y.S.2d 42, 44 (App.
Term 1st Dep't 1982); Yorkshire House Assocs. v. Lulkin, 114 Misc. 2d 40, 44, 450
N.Y.S.2d 962, 965 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1982); Hudson View Properties v.
Weiss, 106 Misc. 2d 251, 255, 431 N.Y.S.2d 632, 636 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1980), rev'd, 109 Misc. 2d 589, 442 N.Y.S.2d 367 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1981), rev'd,
86 A.D.2d 803, 448 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1st Dep't 1982) (adopting dissenting opinion of
Asch, J., 109 Misc. 2d at 595, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 371).
46. 51 N.Y.2d 506, 415 N.E.2d 950, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961.
47. Id. at 515, 415 N.E.2d at 955, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 966 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
48. Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 86 A.D.2d 803, 448 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1st Dep't
1982) (adopting dissenting opinion of Asch, J., 109 Misc. 2d 589, 595, 442 N.Y.S.2d
367, 371 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1981)), a3f'g 106 Misc. 2d 251, 431 N.Y.S.2d 632
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980); Munroe v. 344 E. 76th Realty Corp., 113 Misc.
2d 155, 448 N.Y.S.2d 388 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1982); Yorkshire House Assocs. v.
Lulkin, 114 Misc. 2d 40, 450 N.Y.S.2d 962 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
49. Mishalove v. 109 St. Marks Place, Inc., No. 62-581-H (N.Y.C. Comm'n on
Human Rights Nov. 13, 1981); see also Kramarsky v. Estate of Price, No. 78-29 (Sup.
Ct. Schuyler County, April 5, 1978) (unmarried persons living together must be
treated the same as those legally married).
50. See notes 80-103 infra and accompanying text.
51. Fraydun Enters. v. Ettinger, 91 Misc. 2d 119, 397 N.Y.S.2d 301 (App. Term
1st Dep't 1977); Jema Properties v. McLeod, N.Y.L.J., June 7, 1976, at 8, col. 1
(App. Term 1st Dep't June 4, 1976); see also One-Two East 87th St. Corp. v. Rees,
35 Misc. 2d 158, 232 N.Y.S.2d 292 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1962) (tenant violated the
lease by allowing a friend to stay with her, despite the fact that the friend paid no
rent to the tenant or the landlord).
52. 91 Misc. 2d 119, 397 N.Y.S.2d 301 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1977).
53. Id. at 119, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
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Enterprises was decided two years after the Human Rights Law was
amended to include marital status, the court did not discuss the
Human Rights Law. 54 Similarly, in Jema Properties v. McLeod, 55 the
Appellate Term, without discussing the facts, upheld a Housing Court
judgment that the presence of the tenant's common law husband in
her apartment amounted to a material breach sufficient to warrant
termination of the tenancy. 56
In 1981, the Civil Court of the City of New York in Avest Seventh
Corp. v. Ringelheim57 expressly rejected an extension of the marital
status provision of the Human Rights Law to unmarried couples. 58
The Avest court reasoned that the granting of such protection would
lend itself to the destruction of the family unit, characterized as the
"foundation of society. ' '59 In the following year, however, the Avest
decision was reversed by the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court. 60
This reversal was based entirely on the court's earlier decision in 420
East 80th Co. v. Chin." Chin, like Avest, involved two cohabiting
homosexuals.6 2 The Appellate Term in Chin held that in light of the
54. Although Fraydun Enters. did not discuss the Human Rights Law, the New
York Supreme Court did provide the tenant and his fiancee with an alternative
method to cure. "If, however, undertenant becomes a member of tenant's immediate
family (as appears imminent), or removes from the apartment, within the period of
time herein provided, issuance of the warrant will be stayed until the further order of
this court." Id.
55. N.Y.L.J., June 7, 1976, at 8, col. 1 (App. Term 1st Dep't June 4, 1976).
56. Id.
57. 109 Misc. 2d 284, 286, 440 N.Y.S.2d 159, 161 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1981). The court in Avest rejected the holding of the civil court in Hudson View
Properties v. Weiss, 106 Misc. 2d 251, 431 N.Y.S.2d 632 (N.Y.C. Ct. N.Y. County
1980), which extended the marital status provision of the Human Rights Law to
unwed couples. Avest, 109 Misc. 2d at 286, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
58. 109 Misc. 2d at 286, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 161. In Avest the tenant was sharing her
apartment with another lesbian. The landlord brought the proceeding to recover
possession on the grounds that the apartment was occupied by a person other than a
member of tenant's immediate family. Id. at 284, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 160.
59. Id. at 286, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
60. Avest Seventh Corp. v. Ringelheim, No. 48665-81 (App. Term 1st Dep't Sept.
17, 1982).
61. Id.; 420 E. 80th Co. v. Chin, 115 Misc. 2d 195, 455 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App. Term
1st Dep't 1982).
62. Chin, 115 Misc. 2d at 195-96, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 43. The landlord wanted to
evict the tenants on the grounds that their living arrangement amounted to a substan-
tial violation of a lease provision which limited the tenancy to the tenant and tenant's
immediate family. Id. Although Chin cited Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 86
A.D.2d 803, 448 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1st Dep't 1982), the Appellate Term of the Supreme
Court reasoned that marital status protection would not apply to homosexual coup-
les. Chin, 115 Misc. 2d at 196, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
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"nonexistent vacancy rate"63 in the New York City housing market, it
was not feasible to impose eviction for breach of the "immediate
family" clause absent a showing of prejudice to the landlord.6 4 In both
Avest and Chin the couples were allowed to retain their apartment.
6 5
The traditional view, although undermined by the Avest and Chin
decisions, is supported by the State Human Rights Appeal Board's
decision in Taylor v. Stanley."6 In Taylor, a landlord refused to rent to
a heterosexual couple because they were not husband and wife. 7 The
couple charged that the landlord violated the Human Rights Law by
discriminating against them because of their marital status. The Ap-
peal Board68 dismissed the complaint,69 holding that "[a] person's
marital status can be either single [which includes widowed and
divorced] or married. There is, however, no protection in the law for
lack of marital status or, put in another way, the status of persons
unmarried to each other. "70
The concept that only an individual, not a couple, has a marital
status would appear to negate any argument in favor of prohibiting
landlord discrimination against unwed cohabitants. A Maryland court
63. The court took judicial notice that "the vacancy rate for rental apartments in
[New York City] is virtually nonexistent." Chin, 115 Misc. 2d at 196, 455 N.Y.S.2d at
43.
64. Id. at 196-97.
65. Avest Seventh Corp. v. Ringelheim, No. 48665-81 (App. Term 1st Dep't Sept.
17, 1982); 420 E. 80th Co. v. Chin, 115 Misc. 2d 195, 197, 455 N.Y.S.2d 42, 44
(App. Term 1st Dep't 1982).
66. No. H-M-44102-76 (N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Bd. June 22, 1979).
67. Id. at 1.
68. The New York State Human Rights Appeal Board vacated and reversed the
Order and Decision of the Commissioner of the State Human Rights Division, who
had found for the complainants. Id. "[T]he Commissioner should have first made a
finding as to the person's marital status, and not as was done in this case, the person's
lack of marital status." Id. at 1.
69. Id. at 2. "Since their unmarried relationship is not protected by the Human
Rights Law, the [landlord's] denial of an apartment because of this does not violate
the law." Id. at 1 (emphasis added). The Appeal Board's use of the word "relation-
ship", as opposed to status, mirrored the New York Court of Appeal's language in
Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51 N.Y.2d 506,
415 N.E.2d 950, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1980). For a discussion of this case see notes 37-47
supra and accompanying text. Both Taylor and Manhattan Pizza Hut held that while
an individual's marital status is protected, his marital relationship is not. Taylor, No.
H-M-44102-76, at 1; Manhattan Pizza Hut, 51 N.Y.2d at 512, 415 N.E.2d at 953,
434 N.Y.S.2d at 964. If the New York Court of Appeals applies the marital relation-
ship concept, as opposed to the marital status concept, to the informal living arrange-
ment of the unmarried adults, it is highly unlikely that these cohabitors will be
protected under the Human Rights Law. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying
text for a discussion of Manhattan Pizza Hut's inapplicability to this issue.
70. Taylor, No. H-M-44102-76, at 1.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
applied this concept in Prince George's County v. Greenbelt Homes,
Inc., to uphold a co-op by-law forbidding the sale of housing to
unmarried couples. 71 In Greenbelt, the complainants, a man and
woman living together without marital or consanguinal ties, were
denied membership in a co-op pursuant to a by-law effectively pro-
hibiting joint membership to an unmarried couple.72 The Greenbelt
court reasoned that "[w]hile each [individual] separately had a mari-
tal status, collectively they did not. '73 Since each applicant was not
denied membership because of his or her own individual marital
status (single and unmarried), the policy did not violate a local ordi-
nance prohibiting discrimination on the basis of marital status. 74
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Kraft, Inc. v. State, held that the
inclusion of marital status within the Minnesota Human Rights Law
clearly reflects the protected status the institution of marriage enjoys
in our society. 5 According to Kraft, if unwed couples are entitled to
the same rights belonging to married couples, the preferred status
enjoyed by the institution of marriage would be undermined.76 This
proposition would appear to find support in New York because the
State has strengthened its conviction towards the traditional marital
relationships by abolishing common law marriages. 77 As one New
York court has stated, "[tihe statutory abolition of [common law
marriages] was not a declaration of abhorrence but one of denial of
benefits, rights, and remedies provided by statute to the parties. 7 8
Accordingly, it has been argued that the unmarried couple, although
increasing in numbers and acceptance, should be denied the rights
71. Prince George's County v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 49 Md. App. 314, 431 A.2d
745 (Ct. Spec. App. 1981).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 319, 431 A.2d at 748. The court noted that "[o]nly marriage as pre-
scribed by law can change the marital status of an individual to a new legal entity of
husband and wife." Id.
74. Id. at 319-20, 413 A.2d at 748-49.
75. Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. 1979). See generally
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (marriage is "an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions").
76. 284 N.W.2d at 388.
77. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1977). Common law marriages were
abolished in New York as of April 29, 1933. Kelly v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 352
F. Supp. 270, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); In re Estate of Benjamin, 34 N.Y.2d 27, 30, 311
N.E.2d 495, 496, 355 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358 (1974). Furthermore, the public policy of
New York State has been to withhold recognition of common law marriages. People
v. Allen, 27 N.Y.2d 108, 113, 261 N.E.2d 637, 640, 313 N.Y.S.2d 719, 723 (1970).




and protections provided by the marital status provision of the Hu-
man Rights Law.79
B. The Hudson View Principle
The leading New York case on the subject of the rights of unmarried
cohabitants to housing is Hudson View Properties v. Weiss.80 In Hud-
son View, an unmarried woman shared her apartment with a man
not related to her by blood or marriage. 81 Her landlord instituted a
holdover proceeding 82 alleging that the tenant's living arrangement
was a substantial violation of a covenant of the lease which limited the
occupation of the apartment to the tenant and the tenant's immediate
family. 83 The tenant moved to dismiss, arguing that the lease clause
violated the marital status provision of the Human Rights Law.
84
The appellate division granted the tenant's motion, adopting the
opinion of the civil court. 85 In granting the tenant's motion to dismiss,
the civil court noted the changes in societal mores and the common-
place practice of unmarried cohabitation.86 The civil court interpreted
the Human Rights Law as prohibiting "landlords from differentiating
between those who are married and those who are not married, all
other facts being equal. ' 87 This ruling is popularly referred to as the
Hudson View principle.
79. See cases cited in note 51 supra.
80. 86 A.D.2d 803, 448 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1st Dep't 1982) (adopting dissenting opin-
ion of Asch, J., 109 Misc. 2d 589, 595, 445 N.Y.S.2d 367, 371 (App. Term 1st Dep't
1981)), af'g 106 Misc. 2d 251, 431 N.Y.S.2d 632 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1980).
81. 106 Misc. 2d at 252, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
82. Id. at 251, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 634. A holdover proceeding is a summary proceed-
ing brought pursuant to N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711 (McKinney 1979 & Supp.
1982-1983), whereby a landlord seeks to recover possession of the property upon
termination of the lease.
83. "The typical form lease [in New York City] limits occupancy to 'tenant and the
immediate family of tenant.' If the tenant marries, his spouse can occupy the apart-
ment as a member of the immediate family. But if the tenant invites his lover to live
with him, a different situation arises, because the lover is not a member of tenant's
[immediate] family." How to Handle Unmarried Couples, New York City Apart-
ment Law Insider, Dec. 1981, at 1, col. 1.
84. Hudson View, 106 Misc. 2d at 252, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
85. Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 86 A.D.2d 803, 448 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1st Dep't
1982) (adopting dissenting opinion of Asch, J., 109 Misc. 2d 589, 595, 442 N.Y.S.2d
367, 371 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1981)), aff'g 106 Misc. 2d 251, 431 N.Y.S.2d 632
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
86. Id. at 255, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 636. Justice Asch, in his dissenting opinion at
Appellate Term, would have affirmed the decision of the Civil Court. 109 Misc. 2d
589, 595, 442 N.Y.S.2d 367, 371 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1981) (Asch, J., dissenting).
87. 106 Misc. 2d 251, 255, 431 N.Y.S.2d 632, 636 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1980).
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The Hudson View principle has been adopted by New York courts
in subsequent cases. 8 In Munroe v. 344 East 76th Realty Corp. ,89 the
court issued a preliminary injunction restraining the landlord from
evicting an unwed couple living together. 90 Relying on Hudson View,
the Munroe court held that the complainants demonstrated a likeli-
hood of ultimate success on the merits."' More recently, the New York
City Civil Court extended the Hudson View principle still further. 92
In Yorkshire House Associates v. Lulkin,93 the court was faced with a
situation similar to that presented in Hudson View. In Yorkshire,
however, the original tenant had vacated the premises, leaving his
companion in sole possession. 94 Noting the legitimacy and common-
place practice of non-marital living arrangements, the Yorkshire court
held that the landlord could not discriminate against the live-in solely
because she is not or was not married to the tenant.9 5
Decisions of the administrative agencies created to enforce the Hu-
man Rights Law also support the Hudson View principle. 96 The State
Division of Human Rights, in Kramarsky v. Estate of Price, has held
that the refusal to rent or sell housing to unmarried and unrelated
couples constitutes unlawful marital status discrimination in violation
of the New York Human Rights Law. 97 In Kramarsky,8 the complain-
88. 420 E. 80th Co. v. Chin, 115 Misc. 2d 195, 455 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App. Term 1st
Dep't 1982); Munroe v. 344 E. 76th Realty Corp., 113 Misc. 2d 155, 157, 448
N.Y.S.2d 388, 390 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982); Yorkshire House Assocs. v. Lulkin,
114 Misc. 2d 40, 42-43, 450 N.Y.S.2d 962, 964 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
89. 113 Misc. 2d 155, 448 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
90. Id. at 157-58, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
91. Id. at 157, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
92. Yorkshire House Assocs. v. Lulkin, 114 Misc. 2d 40, 450 N.Y.S.2d 962 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1982). Dissenting from the Appellate Term decision in Hudson
View Properties v. Weiss, 109 Misc. 2d 589, 442 N.Y.S.2d 367, Justice Asch stated:
"[w]hether, if [the tenant] left the apartment, [her paramour] could maintain his
possession is a knotty question which need not be addressed here." Id. at 597, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 372. This "knotty question" was the issue in the Yorkshire case.
93. 114 Misc. 2d 40, 450 N.Y.S.2d 962 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
94. Id. at 41, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 963. The landlord sought to physically evict the
live-in and to technically evict the original tenant on grounds that the original tenant
violated a substantial obligation of the tenancy by allowing the apartment to be
occupied by a person other than the tenant's immediate family. Id. at 41, 450
N.Y.S.2d at 964.
95. Id. at 44, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
96. Mishalove v. 109 St. Marks Place, Inc., No. 62-581-H (N.Y.C. Comm'n on
Human Rights Nov. 13, 1981); see also Kramarsky v. Estate of Price, No. 78-29 (Sup.
Ct. Schuyler County April 5, 1978).
97. Kramarsky v. Estate of Price, No. 78-29 (Sup. Ct. Schuyler County April 5,
1978) quoted in Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 106 Misc. 2d 251, 253, 431
N.Y.S.2d 632, 635 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
98. No. 78-29 (Sup. Ct. Schuyler County April 5, 1978).
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ants had alleged that their offer to purchase real estate was rejected
because they were unwed and expected to live together on the prop-
erty. 9 The court stated that "the Legislature and the Governor in-
tended that we cast aside any prior conceived notions of moral propri-
ety" and treat persons living together without the benefit of clergy the
same as those legally married. l00 Similarly, the New York City Com-
mission on Human Rights in Mishalove v. 109 St. Marks Place, Inc.
has determined that unmarried cohabiting couples are members of a
class protected by the Human Rights Law.' 0 In Mishalove, the land-
lord attempted to terminate the lease because the tenants, an unmar-
ried couple, were living together in violation of a lease provision
limiting the tenancy to the tenant and his immediate family. 10 2 The
Commission ruled that the provision could not stand because it had an
adverse impact on the complainants "by reason of his or her having
participated or failed to participate in a marriage."
0 3
IV. The Hudson View Principle and the Emerging Family Unit
The cases and arguments against granting couples marital status
protection notwithstanding, 10 4 the Hudson View principle, which af-
fords both married and unmarried couples marital status protection
against housing discrimination,1 05 is the appropriate standard of law
to apply.
In 1980 the New York City Civil Court determined that "[c]ohabi-
tation for a number of years cannot be distinguished from marriage
99. Id.
100. Id. at 6.
101. Mishalove v. 109 St. Marks Place, Inc., No. 62-581-H (N.Y.C. Comm'n on
Human Rights Nov. 13, 1981).
102. Id. at 1-2.
103. Id. at 11 (quoting Manhattan Pizza Hut, 51 N.Y.2d 506, 511, 415 N.E.2d
950, 953, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 964 (1980)).
104. Neither Fraydun Enters. v. Ettinger, 91 Misc. 2d 119, 397 N.Y.S.2d 301
(App. Term 1st Dep't 1977), nor Jema Properties v. McLeod, N.Y.L.J., June 7, 1976,
at 8, col. 1 (App. Term 1st Dep't June 4, 1976), should be used to deny marital status
protection to unwed couples. Both cases were decided after the Human Rights Law
was amended to prohibit housing discrimination on the basis of marital status. Yet,
in both cases the Appellate Term failed to consider the then existing marital status
provision. In light of this failure, Fraydun Enters. and Jema Properties are not
dispositive of the issue at hand.
105. Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 106 Misc. 2d 251, 431 N.Y.S.2d 632,
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980), afJ'd mem., 86 A.D.2d 803, 448 N.Y.S.2d 649
(1st Dep't 1982).
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for all purposes."' 06 In Zimmerman v. Burton10 7 a landlord had
brought an action to evict the live-in cohabitant of a recently deceased
tenant from a rent controlled apartment. 108 By applying the same
standard used to determine the existence of a common law marriage,
the court held that the rationale for the New York City Rent Regula-
tions does not permit distinctions between a bereaved live-in and a
widower with a marriage certificate. 0
Common law marriages were abolished in New York" 0 at a time
when societal mores and views towards cohabitation were more con-
servative than at the present. "' However, New York courts still recog-
nize valid common law marriages entered into in the State before
1933112 and all valid common law marriages entered into in sister
states." 3 Today, cohabitation has gained increasing acceptance in
both society 1 4 and the legal system." 5 Accordingly, New York's aboli-
tion of common law marriages a half century ago should be consid-
ered immaterial to a grant of protection to unwed couples under the
1975 marital status amendment to the Human Rights Law.
While the promotion of marriage and the marital relationship is a
valid state interest, 16 the presumption that granting marital status
106. Zimmerman v. Burton, 107 Misc. 2d 401, 403, 434 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128-29
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980) (quoting Rutar Co. v. Gensuke Yoshito, No.
53042-79 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1979)).
107. 107 Misc. 2d 401, 434 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
108. Id. at 402, 434 N.Y.S,2d at 128.
109. Id. at 403-04, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 129. The first factor, which the Zimmerman
court applied, is the presence of a mutual agreement "to act as husband and wife and
to enter into an exclusive and permanent relationship." Id. The second factor applied
in Zimmerman is that the cohabitation must be constant and for a significant period
of time. However, there is no need for the couple to hold themselves out as husband
and wife, as some jurisdictions require. Id.
110. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1977). "No marriage shall be valid
unless solemnized .... " Id.
111. See notes 16-22 supra and accompanying text.
112. People v. Massaro, 288 N.Y. 211, 215, 42 N.E.2d 491, 492 (1942) (common
law marriages contracted before abolition of such marriages by the Domestic Rela-
tions Law of 1933, ch. 606 § 11 (codified at N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 11 (McKinney
1977) (eff. April 29, 1933)), are as valid as solemnized marriages). See also Kelly v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 352 F. Supp. 270, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
113. See, e.g., Mott v. Duncan Petroleum Transp., 51 N.Y.2d 289, 292, 414
N.E.2d 657, 658, 434 N.Y.S.2d 155, 157 (1980); Merritt v. Chevrolet Tonawanda
Div. Gen. Motors Corp., 50 A.D.2d 1018, 1018, 377 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665 (3d Dep't
1975) (State of New York will recognize common law marriages if validly contracted
under the laws of another state).
114. Glendon, supra note 15, at 686,
115. Fineman, supra note 14, at 278; Skolnick, supra note 17, at 341.
116. Vogel v. Pan Am. World Airways, 450 F. Supp. 224, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 831
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protection to unwed couples would destroy the institution of marriage
is incorrect. 1 7 Granting protection to unwed couples does not auto-
matically lead to a breakdown of the marital unit."" Moreover, it has
been suggested that distinctions between married and unmarried
couples cannot possibly promote marriage. 19 In fact, the reverse
could be inferred since certain laws seem to penalize couples who are
married. 120
Rather than the narrower goal of promotion of marriage, the state's
interest should be the promotion of the "family unit.' 1 21 As noted
previously, the Civil Court of the City of New York rejected the
Hudson View principle in Avest Seventh Corp. v. Ringelheim 22 for
fear that it would destroy the family unit, which the court deemed to
be the "foundation of society.' 12 3 The "family unit" to which the
Avest court refers is apparently the traditional family structure of
husband, wife and children. However, a recent New York decision 124
declared that "[t]he 'nuclear family' arrangement is no longer the only
model of family life in America. The realities of present day urban life
allow many different types of nontraditional families. . . .[T]he best
description of a family is a continuing relationship of love and care,
and an assumption of responsibility for some other person. "125
The reasoning of the Avest court fails to account for nontraditional
family structures consisting of a cohabiting man, woman and chil-
dren. 26 If landlords are permitted to discriminate against unwed
(1976); Mitchelson & Glucksman, Equal Protection for Unmarried Cohabitors: An
Insider's Look at Marvin v. Marvin, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 283, 291-93 (1978).
117. Mitchelson & Glucksman, supria note 116, at 291-93.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 292.
120. Id. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
121. Mitchelson & Glucksman, supra note 116, at 292. "At one time the concepts
of the 'family unit' and the 'marital institution' were synonymous." Id. This is no
longer true with the recognition and acceptance of nonmarital relationships. But
"[t]he backbone of society has not been weakened drastically, as it is still the family
unit which constitutes this core, not the institution of marriage." Id.
122. 109 Misc. 2d 284, 286, 440 N.Y.S.2d 159, 161 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1981), rev'd, No. 48665-81 (App. Term 1st Dep't Sept. 17, 1982).
123. Id. at 286, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 161; see also DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d
858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952). "The family is the basic unit of our society, the center of
the personal affections that ennoble and enrich human life." Id. at 863-64, 250 P.2d
at 601.
124. In re Adult Anonymous II, 88 A.D.2d 30, 35, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198, 201 (1st
Dep't 1982).
125. Id.
126. Of the 2.799 million cohabiting couples in this country today, see note 16
supra and accompanying text, 491,000 of these couples have children in their house-
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couples, in many cases such discrimination "would effectively prevent
one of the parents from living with and raising in a close and intimate
relationship his or her own children.' ' 7
Hence, Avest's interpretation of the Human Rights Law fails to
protect the children of unwed cohabiting couples.12 8 Such a result
would be contrary to the state's interest in promoting the family unit.
The Hudson View principle, by contrast, gives equal protection under
the marital status provision of the Human Rights Law to both the
traditional family unit and unwed couples with children. 2
Furthermore, the Hudson View principle is in accord with federal
and state court decisions interpreting various statutes130 as granting
the unwed cohabiting couple numerous protections and benefits.13 '
For example, the District of Columbia Circuit Court, in Markham v.
Colonial Mortgage Service Co. Associates, 32 interpreted the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act as requiring a bank to treat an unwed couple
applying jointly for credit the same as if they were married. 133 In a
California case, Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Authority,' 34 the
holds. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MARITAL STATUS AND
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1980.
127. Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 98, 130 Cal. Rptr.
375, 381 (Ct. App. 1976).
128. Cf. Barry E. (Anonymous) v. Ingraham, 43 N.Y.2d 87, 93, 371 N.E.2d 492,
495, 400 N.Y.S.2d 772, 776 (1977) (state's vital interest in the welfare of its children
is one of its strongest public policies).
129. See Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 86 A.D.2d 803, 448 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1st
Dep't 1982) (adopting dissent of Asch, J., 109 Misc. 2d 589, 595-97, 442 N.Y.S.2d
367, 371-72 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1981)), aff'g 106 Misc. 2d 251, 431 N.Y.S.2d 632
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
130. In 1976 New York State Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz issued an
opinion on discrimination in insurance based on marital status as contained in N.Y.
INS. LAW § 40-e (McKinney 1982). "Cohabitation without marriage clearly involves
a matter of 'marital status' within the meaning of Insurance Law, § 40-e, which may
not be used by an insurance company as a basis for discrimination." 1976 Op. N.Y.
Att'y Gen. 58, 59.
131. See Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., Assocs., 605 F.2d 566 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (discussed at notes 132-33 infra); Washington Water Power Co. v. Wash-
ington State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wash. 2d 62, 586 P.2d 1149 (1978) (ex-
panded definition of "marital status" with respect to anti-nepotism statutes); Atkisson
v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Ct. App.
1976).
132. 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
133. Id. at 570. For an analysis of the Markham decision, see Consumer Credit
and Truth-in-Lending Compliance Report, Sept. 1979, at 2 (E. Phillips ed.). The
commentator criticizes the Fifth Circuit for applying the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act too literally and for misinterpreting congressional intent.
134. Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 130 Cal. Rptr.
375 (Ct. App. 1976).
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policy of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment (HUD) was interpreted to prohibit discrimination against
unwed cohabiting couples in housing. 135 In Atkisson, a case similar to
Hudson View, the tenant was living with a man to whom she was not
related.1 30 The defendant housing authority had a policy prohibiting
cohabitation. 137 The California Court of Appeals held that the defend-
ant's policy violated HUD's prohibition against automatic exclusion of
a particular class by excluding all unwed couples-a class of people
defined by their marital status. 1 38
In addition to the practical considerations of a virtually nonexistent
vacancy rate in New York City housing,' 3 the most important policy
reason why the Hudson View principle should be the standard of law
in this area is that it reflects the changing moral standards of today. 140
Significantly, the principle is consistent with the statutory mandate of
liberal construction,' 4' the interpretation of the Human Rights Law
by the Human Rights agencies' 42 and the increasing acceptance of
cohabitation by society and the courts.' 43
V. Conclusion
Under current New York law, the unwed couple cannot be certain
of receiving marital status protection against housing discrimination.
The Hudson View principle provides such protection as it prohibits
135. Id.
136. Id. at 93-94, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
137. Id. at 93, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
138. Id. at 97, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
139. 420 E. 80th Co. v. Chin, 115 Misc. 2d 195, 196, 455 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (App.
Term 1st Dep't 1982).
140. The law must keep abreast of changing moral standards and recent case law
reflects a recognition of the rights of unmarried couples. Zimmerman v. Burton, 107
Misc. 2d 401, 403, 434 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
141. "The provisions of this article [the Human Rights Law] shall be construed
liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof." N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 300
(McKinney 1982).
142. Mishalove v. 109 St. Marks Place, Inc., No. 62-581-H (N.Y.C. Comm'n on
Human Rights Nov. 13, 1981); see also Kramarsky v. Estate of Price, No. 78-29 (Sup.
Ct. Schuyler County April 5, 1978).
143. Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 106 Misc. 2d 251, 256, 431 N.Y.S.2d 632,
637 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980), rev'd, 109 Misc. 2d 589, 442 N.Y.S.2d 367
(App. Term 1st Dep't 1981), rev'd, 86 A.D.2d 803, 448 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1st Dep't 1982)
(adopting dissenting opinion of Asch, J., 109 Misc. 2d at 595, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 371);
420 E. 80th Co. v. Chin, 115 Misc. 2d 195, 196, 445 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (App. Term 1st
Dep't 1982); Yorkshire House Assocs. v. Lulkin, 114 Misc. 2d 40, 44, 450 N.Y.S.2d
962, 965 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1982). See also Fineman, supra note 14, at
278; Skolnick, supra note 17, at 342.
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landlords from differentiating between married and unmarried coup-
les in housing. This holding should apply to all forms of housing
discrimination based on marital status, including discrimination
aimed at unwed couples. The Hudson View principle evidences legis-
lative intent, legislative history, the position of the Human Rights
Commission, and evolving notions of societal morality. Therefore,
given the commonplace practice of cohabitation, the Hudson View
principle is an appropriate standard to apply.
Alternatively, the legislature should again amend the Human
Rights Law. The amendment should clearly indicate that both the
purpose of the amendment and the legislative intent is to afford
unwed cohabiting couples the protection that married couples enjoy
under the marital status provision of the Human Rights Law.
Matthew G. Connolly
